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 The Danish physicist Neils Bohr wryly observed: ‘Prediction 
is very difficult especially if it’s about the future.’ In that sense, 
Professor Garnaut set himself a very challenging task. How-
ever, reflecting the depth of his scholarship, he has not fallen 
into the trap of prediction. Rather, he has offered nuanced 
projections; the difference is more than semantic. 
economic, social and political forces will 
shape the way societies develop, and, 
critically, how they interact. For this we 
need to appreciate ‘how the world works’. 
And Garnaut offers much insight into the 
economic and political dimensions of 
global development. But then comes the 
really hard part: judging what to do and 
how to do it. What role will national and 
international policies play? What should 
those policies be? To what extent will they 
even matter for the long-term outcomes? 
Here Garnaut recognises the limits of our 
understanding and is suitably cautious.
That productivity gains, complement-
ed by expanded world trade and 
capital flows, have been important 
for underpinning the growth in living 
standards for much of the world is 
undisputed. In recent decades, two key 
forces have principally driven the rate 
of economic growth: a rapidly growing 
labour supply and higher productivity. 
Increasingly, however, we have evidence 
In his speech to the Republican State 
Convention in Springfield, Illinois in 
June 1858, Abraham Lincoln started by 
observing: ‘If we could first know where 
we are, and whither we are tending, we 
could then better judge what to do, and 
how to do it.’ Garnaut’s reflections on 
global economic prospects in the rest of 
the 21st century are very much in the 
spirit of this observation. The starting 
point is an understanding of where we 
are now, and Garnaut has drawn on his 
wealth of knowledge and experience to 
establish that starting point. From there 
he leads us to ‘whither we are tending’. 
This requires an understanding of how 
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that the rate of improvement in 
productivity has been slowing down. And 
that slowing is not solely a phenomenon of 
very recent times, but rather one that has 
been underway since the 1950s; although 
here Garnaut rightly acknowledges that 
measurement issues still potentially cloud 
the true picture of productivity change.
Significant impulses to long-term 
economic growth have come in the 
past from so-called general purpose 
technologies (Lispey, Carlaw and Bekar, 
2005). The standard examples are the 
steam engine, railroads, the internal 
combustion engine, steel and electricity. 
These technologies typically lead to 
fundamental changes in the way societies 
operate.
More recently, we would surely have to 
add information technology (ICT) to our 
list. It is now easier to complete a retail 
purchase from 10,000km away than it is to 
drive 5km on a congested road and then 
search for parking. Brokerage services, 
accounting, banking and insurance can 
all be effected online from just about 
anywhere on the planet at a fraction of the 
real cost of engaging in physical contact 
with providers. Every aspect of modern life 
in both the home and commercial worlds 
is centred on the use of this technology, 
the real cost of which continues to fall. 
And there is good evidence that the 
adoption of ICT has been widespread, and 
notably so in the poorer regions of the 
underdeveloped world. With a smartphone 
a Masai herdsman can have an eye test 
and order prescription spectacles, conduct 
banking, call for emergency medical aid, 
contact family, obtain market prices, 
receive warnings of natural hazards – in 
short, be as globally connected as a bond 
trader in Frankfurt.
We might, therefore, reasonably 
expect that the transfer of technology to 
less developed areas will be increasingly 
facilitated, resulting in gains in 
productivity and leading inexorably 
towards convergence with wealthy nations 
– ‘the only stable end-point’ of modern 
economic growth, as Garnaut argues. 
But, despite the technological advances, 
we are left with the conundrum so aptly 
captured by Robert Solow’s 1987 quip: 
‘You can see the computer age everywhere 
but in the productivity statistics.’
Garnaut creates the sense that the 
global economy will follow somewhat 
evenly along the paths he suggests in 
each of the three blocks of countries he 
identifies. However, it is highly likely that 
the future course will be punctuated with 
shocks; we know from the past that this 
has always been the case and it would be 
challenging to mount a credible argument 
that such shocks will diminish in future. 
We can distinguish two types of 
shocks: natural disasters, and political 
perturbations whose origins lie in the very 
process of economic growth. For natural 
disasters we can invest in preparedness, 
avoid policies that favour locating in risky 
zones, and improve the systems of rapid 
deployment of emergency relief. The 
second type represents a greater challenge, 
and typically has wider ramifications 
than the more localised impact of natural 
disasters. Garnaut acknowledges the 
challenges for economic growth in the 
Pacific, where failed states have become 
the rule. While economic growth has 
picked up in parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa, the record is spotty at best, and 
the political instability that characterises 
the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Sudan and the 
Congo is not an encouraging backdrop for 
sustained growth. But more worrying still 
is the instability in the Middle East, across 
North Africa and through Syria, Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Today, real per capita GDP 
in Iraq is lower than it was in 1950. The 
prospects for return to any serious rate of 
sustainable economic growth across the 
region would seem remote.
But it is not only in Africa and the 
Middle East that tensions can disrupt 
the path of economic growth. Garnaut 
logically gives centre stage to China in 
his analysis of world economic growth. 
Of its growing importance there can be 
no doubt. Depending on which estimates 
you prefer, China is already the world’s 
largest economy, with some 17% of 
global GDP; its economy is about three 
times the size of Japan’s and four times 
the size of Germany’s. Of course, this 
is not a new state of the world. In 1700 
China and India each generated about 
25% of global GDP; in 1820 China alone 
accounted for 33%. 
A large share of the total growth 
in world GDP recently has been due to 
China. One view is that sustained high 
growth in China (and India) will, via 
trade and commodity prices, have positive 
spillovers and pull the rest of the world 
along. However, there may be grounds 
for some scepticism about whether China 
will converge with the income levels of 
the rich nations, especially by the 2020s 
as Garnaut suggests. A recent paper 
(Pritchett and Summers, 2014) argues 
that the recent periods of high economic 
growth in China are to some extent an 
aberration. By analysing the data on 
economic growth across a large sample 
of countries, the authors find a strong 
reversion to mean, and a tendency among 
the more rapidly growing economies to 
experience sharp discontinuities. They 
build a strong case that a) forecasts for 
continued high rates of growth in China 
are overly optimistic, and b) China will 
While economic growth has picked up in 
parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the record is 
spotty at best, and the political instability 
that characterises the Ivory Coast, 
Nigeria, Sudan and the Congo is not 
an encouraging backdrop for sustained 
growth.
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inevitably have those discontinuities, the 
probability of which is heightened by 
the presence of an autocratic political 
structure. The authors conclude:
It is impossible to argue that either 
China or India have the kinds of 
‘quality institutions’ that have been 
associated with the steady dynamic 
of growth in the currently high 
productivity countries. The risks of 
‘sudden stops’ are much higher with 
weak institutions and organizations 
for policy implementation. China 
and India have very different 
modalities of this risk, but both have 
tricky paths to continued prosperity. 
(Pritchett and Summers, 2014, p.58)
Will China’s growing domination 
in world trade lead to calls for greater 
protection in importing countries? China 
now produces more steel than the rest of 
the world combined, and anti-dumping 
investigations or cries for protection are 
already underway in the United States, 
the European Union, India, Korea and 
Australia. Such moves have the potential 
to result in a weakening of free trade 
and a consequent slowing of growth and 
misallocation of global resources.
History suggests that rising incomes 
and greater economic freedom go hand 
in hand with greater political freedom. 
Can China continue its unprecedented 
economic growth (even at more modest 
rates) and at the same time manage 
the inevitable tensions that build as a 
consequence of becoming a wealthier, 
more powerful and globally connected 
society? Is the Platonic guardians model 
a political structure for China that is 
sustainable in the long term? Some might 
look to the ‘one-party democracy’ of 
Singapore as a model that China might 
emulate – although comparing a city state 
to a nation as enormous and diverse as 
China would seem to stretch credibility. 
If China were to succeed in sustaining 
its model of governing for, rather than 
by, the people, it would surely become a 
significant outlier from the association of 
democracy and economic well-being.
We simply do not know how the 
interaction of the economic and political 
forces will play out in China, but I would 
argue that it is unlikely to be resolved 
without some ructions along the way. 
And given its size, those perturbations, 
however minor, will inevitably send 
waves, varying from ripples to tsunamis, 
to the wider world economy. We have 
already seen the consequences of boom 
and bust arising from changes in the 
level and pattern of import demand in 
China. Australia is feeling a chill wind as 
China’s growth strategy moves beyond its 
energy- and metal- intensive phase, while 
New Zealand has had its own commodity 
boom driven in good measure by exports 
to China. But these bumps and hollows 
could pale into insignificance alongside 
the ramifications of a major political 
‘realignment’. The rest of the world, living 
with an enormous economic powerhouse, 
is analogous to Canada cohabiting with 
the US. When asked by a journalist from 
the US about that relationship, Prime 
Minister Trudeau responded: ‘Living next 
to you is in some ways like sleeping with 
an elephant. No matter how friendly and 
even-tempered is the beast, if I can call it 
that, one is affected by every twitch and 
grunt.’
A fundamental challenge not 
mentioned by Garnaut is the capacity 
of the world to feed itself. To date the 
record has been impressive. In 1961 food 
for the global population of 3.5bn came 
from 1.4bn hectares. Fifty years later 
the population had doubled to 7bn and 
agricultural land use had risen only to 
1.5bn hectares. The growth of agricultural 
productivity has been truly remarkable, 
and has had widespread benefits: real 
agricultural prices fell by some 70% 
during the 20th century.
With little or no possibility for 
further expansion in land area, the 
world will be fed only through sustained 
growth in agricultural productivity. 
New developments in production and 
processing might well contribute to the 
required growth of productivity. Precision 
farming, zero tillage, genetic modification, 
biological control and microbial fertilisers 
are just some of the innovations that will 
drive future productivity. However, none 
of this will happen easily; there are both 
political and environmental challenges. 
Deforestation, desertification, agricultural 
run-offs, falling ground water levels and 
declining water quality are just some 
of the potential barriers to sustained 
agricultural productivity growth.
In summary, Garnaut well recognises 
the headwinds that global economic 
growth may encounter: his top three 
candidates are climate change, lagging 
growth among the world’s poorest, and 
the capture of the policy-making process 
by vested interests. To those I would add 
the capacity to feed ourselves and, above 
all else, the potential global economic 
ramifications that might stem from 
political perturbations in China. The 
first will require sustained investment in 
research and development, supported by 
polices that price resources at marginal 
social cost and deal with environmental 
externalities. Avoiding the second will 
require uncanny political management 
by the Chinese leadership, supported by 
robust global institutions. We can only 
hope that our understanding of China’s 
rise to become the major economic and 
political force in the world will continue 
to be enhanced by those such as Professor 
Garnaut. 
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